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Abstrat
An important question for the European Union is to know whether its institutions
will permit it to esape from politial deadloks eah time a question is at stake. Two
studies [1, 7℄ suggest, by using the Impartial Culture assumption to model the voting
behavior, that the EU ould only take a deision in 2% of the ases with its urrent voting
mehanisms. The Impartial Culture model has been ritiized from a theoretial point of
view [5℄, a politial one [12℄ and does not t with experimental data [10℄. The generalized
Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption we onsider in this paper is an improvement of
this rst model. We here study the probability of approval under this assumption, rst for
the asymptoti ase (reahed when the number of ountries N goes to innity), and next
with omputer enumerations and Monte Carlo simulations for the European Union with
27 members. We onsider both the Treaty of Nie and some proposals for the European
Constitution.
JEL lassiation: D7
1 Introdution
In the last ve years, a onsiderable body of researh on the hoie of the best voting rules
for federal union have been inspired by the debates on the Treaty of Nie and the projets for
an European Constitution. Without being exhaustive, we an mention the work by Baldwin,
Berglof, Giavazzi and Widgren [1℄, Barbera and Jakson [2℄, Bobay [4℄, Feix, Lepelley, Merlin
and Rouet [5℄, Felsenthal and Mahover [7, 9℄, Laruelle and Widgren [11℄. All these ontribu-
tions share a ommon organization: the authors propose a voting model, and then seek for the
voting rule or the onstitution that better ts aording to some normative riteria.

SUBATECH, Eole des Mines de Nantes, La hanterie, 4 rue A Kastler, BP 20722, F-44307 Nantes edex
3, Frane
y
CERESUR, Department of Eonomis, Universite de La Reunion, 97715 Saint-Denis edex 9, Frane
z
CREM and CNRS. MRSH bureau 230, Universite de Caen, Esplanade de la Paix, 14032 Caen edex, Frane
x
Laboratoire de Mathematique, Appliations et Physique Mathematique -UMR6628, Universite d'Orleans,
UFR des Sienes, F-45067 Orleans Cedex 2, Frane
1
Reently a welome and quite useful disussion between a high level politiian (Axel Moberg)
and sientists (Dan Felsenthal and Moshe Mahover) has developed [12, 8℄. At the origin, the
sienti analysis of the Treaty of Nie [1, 8℄ laims that the need of 255 (or 258) votes (on a
total of 345) to approve a proposition will result in a serious deadlok at the ounil of min-
isters with an a priori probability of approval of 2%. A. Moberg disagrees strongly, pointing
out that the result ignores the \strong onsensual ulture of the EU". Who is right ? In fat,
the sienti analysis given in [1, 8℄ is only a part of the full story : it is based on the use
of the Impartial Culture (IC hereafter) model, whih states that eah ountry hooses to vote
`yes' or `no' independently with equal probability. In other words, eah ountry ips a fair oin
to take a deision! But another model exists, whih is more subtle and less easy to ompute.
This model, alled Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC), asserts that all the distributions of
the votes at the Union level are equally likely.
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The aim of this study is to show that the use of a model related to the IAC one is able to
give answers whih are loser to the reality of the European Union with 27 members (EU27
hereafter) and, in some way, takes into aount the onsensual harater of the vote. By depart-
ing from the ommon IC assumption, we obtain a theoretial probability of passing a motion
that turns out to be higher. Our result onerns not only the Treaty of Nie with its famous
74.8% majority rule (one key vote), but also one of the deision shemes that have been sug-
gested during the debates for the European Constitution (double key vote: a motion is passed
if it is supported by more than 50% of the ountries gathering more than 50% of the population).
The paper is organized as follows. In setion 2, we present a generalized IAC model (GIAC) and
we briey disuss its adequation to the vote at the ounil. In setion 3, we give the theoretial
probability of approval in the asymptoti limit, i.e. when the number of ountries (denoted by
N in what follows) goes to innity. Setion 4 heks the relevane of this asymptoti solution
for EU27, by providing numerial simulations, and we present our onlusions in setion 5.
2 The dierent models
We onsider binary issue votes `yes' or `no' for the N states (elsewhere voters, MPs, et...) of a
federal union. In the simplest IC model, eah vote is independent of the others and eah voter
says `yes' or `no' with equal probability p = 1=2. IC has serious drawbaks. It desribes a vote
where either everybody is undeided (no exhange of points of view allowing the emergene of
a majority has taken plae) or the existene of two bloks of stritly equal importane. In both
ases, the vote will be won by a margin going as N
1=2
. This explains the low probability of
approval with a quota of 258/345 i.e. 74:8% in the Treaty of Nie deision sheme. The idea
is onsequently to introdue a model where a probability p dierent from 1/2 has emerged.
Moreover, our knowledge of p is itself of a probabilisti nature, it is mathematially desribed
by the funtion f(p) whih is the probability distribution of p. The emergene of a probability
p dierent from 1/2 seems rather natural in an assembly where ertainly long disussions,
explanations, ompromises, pakage deals, et. . . preede eah vote (the \onsensual ulture" of
A. Moberg). Notie that, all these disussions are resumed in a p 6= 1=2 and that the subsequent
1
Notie that the widely used Banzhaf power index relies upon the IC probability assumption. For its part,
the IAC model an be assoiated to the Shapley{Shubik power index. The link between the probability models
and power indies was rst emphasized by StraÆn [13℄ and Berg [3℄.
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votes are independent. Then the GIAC model is haraterized by a given f(p) with 0  p  1,
f(p)  0 and
R
1
0
f(p)dp = 1. The funtion f(p) = 1 for all p gives the IAC model. With this
model, the average number of votes for whih n voters of equal importane, on a total of N ,
have voted `yes' reads
C
n
N
Z
1
0
p
n
(1  p)
N n
dp =
1
N + 1
: (1)
All values of n (from 0 to N) have the same probability 1=(N + 1), onsequently, for the IAC
model, the probability to have n `yes' on a total of N voters is a at urve. It is also easily
proved that, if both n and N go to innity while the ratio n=N is kept onstant, the probability
distribution of n is to rst order in =N
F
N
(n) =
1
N
f(
n
N
): (2)
This result is a diret onsequene of the possibility of interpreting a probability as a frequeny
when the number of random drawings goes to innity and would be trivial if we were not
dealing with a double probability onept as mentioned above.
Now let us suppose that eah of the N voters has one vote and that Q votes are needed
for an approval. Let q = Q=N . Then for the IAC model, the probability of approval is 1  q,
independent of N . For q = :75, for example, the IAC model gives a 25% hane for an approval,
while the omputation using the IC model gives 0:3% for N = 27 voters.
3 The probability of approval in the asymptoti limit
In a more generalized ase, voter i has a
i
votes (or mandates); moreover, two kinds of mandates
have been proposed in the EU onstitution : eah voter has two mandates a
i
and b
i
, and his
(her) vote (`yes' or `no') is used in two qualied majority games A and B, the respetive quotas
being Q
A
and Q
B
. Notie that for eah player i, it is the same vote (`yes' or `no') whih is used
to ompute the number of mandates obtained respetively with keys A and B. The two quotas
must be reahed for nal approval, eah one being related to a ertain type of legitimay. The
EU Constitution projet proposes for ountry i to take a
i
= 1 and b
i
equal to the population
of state i.
In order to be able to perform analytial omputations, to see the role of f(p) and the inuene
of the dierent quotas, we suppose that N is large enough to use asymptoti alulations. At
the end, we will ompare the obtained asymptoti results to numerial simulations and will see
that, as already stated in [6℄, EU27 an be fairly approximated by this limit at least for the
one key vote (the details of the alulations are given in appendix).
For the GIAC model, haraterized by f(p), the distribution funtion for x mandates in favor
of approval in the single key ase reads
F
N
(x) =
1
A
f(x=A); (3)
while for the double key ase, we obtain
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FN
(x; y) =
1
AB
Æ(
x
A
 
y
B
) f

p =
x
A
=
y
B

; (4)
where Æ is the Dira distribution and x and y are the numbers of mandates in favor of approval
for keys A and B respetively. Note that x and y are stritly orrelated (
x
A
=
y
B
). In formulae
(3) and (4), A and B are dened by
A =
N
X
i=1
a
i
; B =
N
X
i=1
b
i
: (5)
For the IAC model (f(p) = 1) and a single key vote, equation (3) means a at density from
x = 0 to x = A. Still for the IAC model but for the double key vote, the points are loated
on the segment joining (x = 0; y = 0) and (x = A; y = B) with a uniform distribution on this
segment. In the approximation used to obtain (3) and (4), votes haraterized by p give points
loated at x = pA and y = pB.
Note that these results hold for N going to innity. It an be shown that the rst orretion (N
large but not innite) provides a diusion around these points in N
 1=2
. While this sattering
slightly modies the atness of F
N
(x) for the one key vote, it transforms the segment of the
two key vote into a long ellipse with a ratio long over small axes in N
1=2
. Coming bak to the
segment struture, we see that in the double key vote ase, with two unequal quotas, it is the
one with the highest quota whih will set up the frequeny of `yes' votes. Also, we must point
out that equation (3) is a generalization of equation (2) obtained for a set of voters with one
mandate eah (in that ase A = N). Notie also that integration of (4) respetively on y and
x gives
F
N
(x) =
1
A
f(
x
A
); and F
N
(y) =
1
B
f(
y
B
); (6)
in agreement with the results of the one key vote.
Conerning the double key vote, it is worth notiing that, for any N (not neessarily going to
innity) and for quotas equal to A=2 and B=2, the voting power of a state X (i.e. its probability
of being pivotal) is given by
P (X) =
P
A
(X) + P
B
(X)
2
(7)
where P
A
(X) and P
B
(X) are the voting powers of X with (respetively) keys A and B. This
result is valid for IC, IAC and GIAC models when f(p) = f(1  p).
To end this setion, a omparison with the results of the IC model is in order. The above
treatment with f(p) = Æ(p 1=2) onentrates all the points at the entral point (x = A=2; y =
B=2). This onrms the quikly dereasing probability of approval when the quotas are not
very losed to 1=2. For the double key vote, with the IC model, the authors have arried the
omputations of the next term to obtain the sattering around the entral point. The approval
probability obtained analytially for the two relative quotas equal to 1=2 reads
P =
1

artan(
p
1 + r
p
1  r
) (8)
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where r =
P
N
i=1
a
i
b
i
=
h
P
N
i=1
a
2
i
P
N
i=1
b
2
i
i
1=2
is the orrelation fator between vote A and vote B.
P varies from 1=4 (r = 0) to 1=2 (r = 1, obtained for b
i
= ka
i
, in fat a single vote).
4 Numerial simulations
In this setion, the results of numerial simulations will be shown for the IAC ase. Beause
we want to reah the asymptoti limit whih supposes both an important number of eletions
and a large number of voters, Monte Carlo method should be used. Atually, it is not possible,
when the number of voters is large, to enumerate, stok and ompute the 2
N
ongurations
beause of lak of memories and omputation time.
In addition, the Monte Carlo tehnique will illustrate learly the double probabilisti harater
of the IAC model. This method onsists to make a random sampling among all the vote ong-
urations, but without taking all of them. Then the ontribution of all the samples are gathered.
The method has two steps. First a probability p is hosen at random in the distribution fun-
tion f(p). Seond a vote onguration is hosen aordingly this probability p : for eah of the
N voters, a random number is taken in a uniform distribution, if this number is lower than p,
the voter gives its mandates (it is a `yes' vote) while he doesn't if the number is higher. This
is in fat an aeptation-rejetion method and if the number of voters is large, the number of
`yes' voters divided by N will tend toward p. This proess is repeated for a large number of
eletions with, at eah eletion, a hoie of a new p into f(p) and so on.
Notie that the results of the IC model ould also be obtained by this tehnique. The proba-
bility p of the N voters is then equal to 1=2 whih orresponds to f(p) = Æ(p  1=2).
First we give the obtained results for a large number of voters (N = 100) and M = 50000
eletions, both for a single key and a double key vote using the Monte Carlo tehnique. For
the single key ase, gure 1 shows the histogram of the number of ongurations, as a funtion
of the related number of mandates. The mandates of the N states have been taken at random
in a uniform distribution between 1 and 5, then the sum has been normalized to 100. This
normalization does not hange the ratio 5 between the highest value of the mandates and the
smallest one. The histogram is at in agreement with equation (3) and the probability of ap-
proval is very lose to (1  q).
For the double key ase, gure 2 gives the distribution of the M eletions performed in the
plane (x; y), one point representing one eletion. For both keys, the mandates have been taken
at random in a uniform distribution between 1 and 5, then the sum has been normalized to
100. Beause all the points have the same weight, their density gives the value of F
N
(x; y) (see
equation (4)). As expeted, the points are roughly distributed on the segment delimited by
the two points (0; 0) and (A;B). In addition to this global behavior, the distribution shows a
ertain sattering. Consequently the results obtained in the asymptoti limit are reovered (at
least for N = 100 voters). We have heked that, for this ase, the probability of approval is
losely given by 1  sup(Q
A
; Q
B
) as shown table 1. For example, for Q
A
= Q
B
= 70%, we get
29:3% of approval and for Q
A
= 50% and Q
B
= 80%, we get 20:4%.For gure 3 the number
of voters has been inreased up to N = 1000. We observed that the sattering of the points
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Key A
14 17 19 22 25
50% 48.66 40.15 30.34 20.53 10.59
60% 40.08 39.11 30.34 20.53 10.59
Key B 70% 30.42 30.42 29.40 20.53 10.59
80% 20.49 20.49 20.49 19.58 10.59
90% 10.55 10.55 10.55 10.55 9.92
Table 1: Double key vote. Perentage of approval for the simulation presented gure 1 as a
funtion of the two quotas Q
A
and Q
B
.
dereases as expeted.
Figure 1: One key vote. Distribution of the
results of the votes for N = 100 voters and
50; 000 eletions using the Monte Carlo teh-
nique. The mandates are hosen at random
in a ratio 1 to 5 and the sum is normalized
to 100.
Figure 2: Double key vote. Distribution of
the results of the votes for N = 100 voters
and 50; 000 eletions using the Monte Carlo
tehnique. The mandates are hosen at ran-
dom in a ratio 1 to 5 and the sum is normal-
ized to 100. Eah point represents an ele-
tion.
Now, the question is to know whether or not the asymptoti limit is a good approximation for
the EU27
2
. It is here possible to enumerate the 2
27
vote ongurations (taking are of their
dierent weights). For the single key ase, gure 4 shows the histogram of the number of ong-
urations as a funtion of the related number of mandates, whih have been taken proportional
to the square root of the state populations. This hoie is in aordane with the priniple used
in the EU15 and onstitutes a good ompromise between the state legitimay and the itizen
legitimay (see [4℄). Again, the urve is rather at, at least for q between 0.2 and 0.8, indiating
2
Population data an be found in Moberg [12℄.
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Figure 3: Double key vote. Distribution of the results of the votes for N = 1000 voters and
50; 000 eletions using the Monte Carlo tehnique. The mandates are hosen at random in a
ratio 1 to 5 and the sum is normalized to 100. Eah point represents an eletion.
Key A
14 17 19 22 25
50% 45.44 38.27 31.92 21.42 10.71
60% 39.56 35.60 30.86 21.33 10.71
Key B 70% 31.56 30.20 27.73 20.68 10.71
80% 22.75 22.54 21.86 18.40 10.55
90% 13.64 13.64 13.61 12.80 9.03
Table 2: Double key vote. Perentage of approval for the EU27 as a funtion of the two
quotas Q
A
and Q
B
. The results have been obtained by omplete enumeration of all the vote
ongurations.
that the asymptoti limit ould be used for this single key vote.
For the double key ase, we turn bak to Monte Carlo simulations (although omplete enumer-
ation is possible) beause eah point has the same weight. Then, it is easier to interpret gure 5
whih gives the distribution of 2,700 vote ongurations in the plane (x; y) (one point represents
one eletion). For key A, all the mandates are equal to 1 (state legitimay) while for key B, the
number of mandates of a state is proportional to its population. The sum of the mandates of
key B has been normalized to 100. Beause of the disrete nature of the key A mandates, the
points are aligned on vertial lines distant of 1. The sattering of the points, not negligible, is
ompatible with the N
 1=2
law as stated before. Neverthless the rule 1  sup(Q
A
; Q
B
) for the
approval is fairly satised as shown by table 2.
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Figure 4: One key vote. Distribution of the
results of the votes for the EU27. The man-
dates are proportional to the square root of
the populations of the states and the sum is
normalized to 100.
Figure 5: Double key vote. Distribution of
the results of the votes for the EU27. For key
A (x variable) all the mandates are equal to
1, for key B (y variable) the mandates are
proportional to the populations of the states
and the sum is normalized to 100.
5 Conlusion
Exept if we take quotas losed to 1=2, IC and IAC (or GIAC) give results whih dier by a
large fator. Can we deide whih model is the more appropriate ? The question is of great
importane if we remember that the two main power indies (Banhzaf and Shapley{Shubik)
are respetively based on IC and IAC models. In the rst appliations of statistial models to
voting theory, like the studies omputing the Condoret eet probability, it was often found
that the two models were giving very similar results. It is with the study of more sophistiated
problems (like the one we have here onsidered) that the fundamentals dierenes between the
two models beome apparent. In [5℄, the authors have ritiized the IC model whih desribes
so tied eletions that they an be onsidered as not having fullled their role. In this paper, the
GIAC model (with its arbitrary f(p)) was introdued and allows us to produe more sensible
results. We have shown that the ritis of A. Moberg were direted against the IC model but
an be easily answered through the use of the IAC model.
Finally, it is of interest to mention a reent study by Gelman et alii [10℄ that gives rst insights
on the nature of the relevant probability models. The hief merit of this study is that it analyzes
data from Amerian and European eletions. It is shown that, for eletions with a large number
of voters N , the N
1=2
sale for the dierenes between two issues is not orret and must be
replaed by an N

sale
3
. This onrms that the searh for the adequate f(p) (whih must
3
Using statistial tehnique, the authors arrive at  = :9, but themselves insist that this value must be taken
with aution and that a N sale may be orret.
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be reasonably stable from one eletion to the other) is of ruial importane. Of ourse, this
dierene between IAC and IC votes is muh less important when the number of voters is small.
But, with 27 members, the proess of voting may beome more frequent and more important,
then realisti models must be used. Analysis of the previous votes and \experimental votes"
(to test new hypothesis) will be welome.
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Appendix
We provide in this appendix the details of the alulations leading to relations (3) and (4).
We suppose that N is large enough to use asymptoti alulations.
1. One key vote
Let us suppose that after the i rst votes, the number x of \yes" mandates has a repartition
F
i
(x). The next vote brings x at x + a
i+1
(\yes" vote) with probability p and x stays at its
value (\no" vote) with probability q = 1  p. Consequently F
i+1
(x) reads
F
i+1
(x) =
Z
F
i
(x  a)P
i+1
(a)da (9)
where P
i+1
(a) is the probability that x inreases of a. Here
P
i+1
(a) = p Æ(a  a
i+1
) + q Æ(a) (10)
where Æ is the Dira distribution dened by the following properties
Z
1
 1
Æ(x  x
0
)f(x)dx = f(x
0
) ; Æ(x) =
1
jj
Æ(x)
The distribution Æ(x) an be onsidered as the limit when  ! 0 of the Gaussian
(2)
 1=2

 1
exp( x
2
=2
2
)
with  > 0.
We reognize in equation (9) a onvolution produt whih is hanged into an ordinary produt
using a Fourier transform. Calling
^
F
i+1
(k),
^
F
i
(k) and
^
P (k) the Fourier transforms of F
i+1
(x),
F
i
(x) and P (x) respetively, equation (10) reads
^
P
i+1
(k) = p exp(ika
i+1
) + q; (11)
while the Fourier transform of the nal F
N
(x; p) reads
^
F
N
(k; p) =
N
Y
i=1
(p exp(ika
i
) + q) : (12)
The inverse Fourier transform gives the expression of F
N
(x; p) :
F
N
(x; p) =
1
2
Z
1
 1
N
Y
i=1
(p exp(ika
i
) + q) exp( ikx)dk: (13)
Notie that equation (13) is an exat formula valid for any N and desribes exatly the 2
N
possible ongurations assoiated to the N votes. In the asymptoti limit, the term given by
equation (12) only ontributes to the integral (13) around k = 0. In this operation, we break
the true nature of F
N
(x; p) whih is a sum of 2
N
Dira and turn F
N
(x; p) into a ontinuum.
Consequently to obtain the asymptoti solution, we expand this term to rst order in k :
p exp(ika
i
) + q = p(1 + i ka
i
) + q = 1 + i p ka
i
: (14)
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Taking the logarithm to ompute the produt we get
^
F
N
(k; p) = exp(ikp
N
X
i=1
a
i
): (15)
Calling A =
P
N
i=1
a
i
, F
N
(x; p) reads
F
N
(x; p) = Æ(x  pA): (16)
But equation (16) is again a quite understandable result. It states that after N votes with
probability p of \yes", the number of mandates obtained is pA.
Taking into aount in equation (14) the k
2
terms would bring a diusion around this value.
The average displaement varies as A (i.e. as N) when the ignored diusion has a sale of
p
A
(i.e. varies as N
 1=2
). The last step is the p integration with
F
N
(x) =
Z
1
0
f(p) Æ(x  pA)dp =
1
A
f(x=A): (17)
Equation (17) is stritly idential to (2) where all voters have the same number of mandates
(one, for example). We simply have to replae N by A. In all ases, keeping only the leading
term of the expansion, the distribution of x=A reprodues the distribution f(p) whih hara-
terizes the GIAC.
2. Double key vote
For the double key vote, the omputation is quite similar to the preeding one. The probability
P
i+1
(a; b) that voter i + 1 moves the sore (x; y) to (x+ a; y + b) is
P
i+1
(a; b) = p Æ(a  a
i+1
) Æ(b  b
i+1
) + q Æ(a) Æ(b) (18)
with, as usual, q = 1  p. The double Fourier transform of equation (18) reads
^
P
i+1
(k; l) = p exp(i k a
i+1
+ i l b
i+1
) + q (19)
and the double Fourier transform
^
F
N
(k; l; p) of F
N
(x; y; p) is
^
F
N
(k; l; p) =
N
Y
i=1
[p exp (i(k a
i
+ l b
i
)) + q℄ : (20)
Again equation (20) is an exat formula. Now to ompute its Fourier transform, we expand up
to rst order in k and l and obtain in this approximation
^
F
N
(k; l; p) = exp
 
ip(k
N
X
i=1
a
i
+ l
N
X
i=1
b
i
)
!
; (21)
whih is a straightforward generalization of equation (15). Introduing A =
P
N
i=1
a
i
and B =
P
N
i=1
b
i
, taking the inverse Fourier transform, we get for these votes haraterized by p
F
N
(x; y; p) = Æ(x  pA) Æ(y   pB) (22)
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whih is a generalization of equation (16). For the last step, the p integration, we use the
relation
Z
1
 1
Æ(p  ) Æ(p  ) f(p)dp = Æ(  ) f()
where  =  = . Finally
F
N
(x; y) =
1
AB
Æ(
x
A
 
y
B
) f

p =
x
A
=
y
B

: (23)
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